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United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The
Implications of International Abductions by
the United States

I.

INTRODUCTION

As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "The issue in this case is whether a
criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with
which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts."1 Respondent, Humberto AlvarezMachain, was indicted for his involvement in the murder of a United
States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent.2 Respondent
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming first that his abduction constituted outrageous governmental conduct, and second, that he was abducted in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Mexico ("Treaty").3 The district court, after rejecting the outrageous
conduct claim, nonetheless held that it lacked jurisdiction to try respondent because his abduction violated the Treaty.4
Relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,l
the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment.6 Because
the United States had authorized the abduction, and Mexico had officially protested the conduct, the intermediate court held that the purpose7
of the Treaty-to facilitate cooperative extraditions-had been violated.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower court's
decision.8 In the absence of express language prohibiting forcible abductions between the two nations, the actions taken by the United States
1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
3. Id. For the full text of the Treaty, see Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United
States-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
4. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
5. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). In
Verdugo-Urquidez the court of appeals held that when the forcible abduction was with authorization of the United States, when the offended nation formally protested to the abduction, and when the extradition treaty did not expressly prohibit such abductions, the "purpose" of the treaty would be violated and jurisdiction would be defeated. 939 F.2d at 1362.
6. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. Id.
8. 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
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were not in violation of the Extradition Treaty.' In a 6-3 decision, the
Court held that the fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of the criminal laws
of this country.10 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded."
II.

FACTUAL STATEMENT

Respondent, a medical doctor, was a citizen and resident of Mexico. On
April 2, 1990, DEA officials forcibly kidnapped him from his office in
Guadalajara, Mexico, flew him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, and
arrested him. A grand jury indicted Alvarez-Machain for participating in
the kidnap and murder of United States DEA special agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena. The
DEA contended that respondent was involved in the murder by prolonging agent Camarena's life so that others could further torture and interro2
gate him.'
Apparently, DEA officials had first attempted to gain respondent's
presence in the United States through informal negotiations with Mexican officials. When those efforts proved unsuccessful, DEA officials, using
-a contact in Mexico, offered to pay a reward plus expenses in return for
the delivery of respondent to the United States.'8 Although they were not
personally involved in the abduction, the district
court concluded that
1
DEA agents were responsible for the action. 4
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
In attempting-to decide the present issue, the Supreme Court took a
three-step approach. First, the Court laid out the relevent case law pertaining to issues similar to the one presented in this case. Second, the
Court looked to the terms of the Treaty, and the history of negotiation
and practice under the Treaty, in reaching the conclusion that the Treaty
did not prohibit respondent's abduction. Third, the Court looked to principles of international law and found no support for construing the
Treaty to include an implied term prohibiting abductions."
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2193.
at 2197.
at
at
at
at

2190.
2190 n.2.
2190.
2190-97.
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Relevant Law

The Court relied primarily on three prior Supreme Court cases that
addressed similar issues to the one presented in Alvarez-Machain.
In United States v. Rauscher," the Court considered whether the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,17 which governed extraditions between England and the United States, prohibited the prosecution of defendant Rauscher for a crime other than the crime for which he had been
extradited.1 8 This prohibition, known as the doctrine of specialty, became
a source of debate between the parties because it was not expressly provided for in the terms of the treaty.1' Justice Miller, writing for the
Court, examined the terms and history of the treaty, the practice of nations regarding extradition treaties, the case law from the states, and the
writings of commentators, in reaching his decision to construe the treaty
with an implied doctrine of specialty.' 0 Justice Miller concluded that
when a person has been brought within the jurisdiction of a court "by
virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty," he can only be tried
for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition."' In Rauscher, unlike the present case, the defendant was brought
to the United States
using an extradition treaty and no issue of a forcible
2
abduction existed.

2

In Ker v. Illinois,"s the Supreme Court ruled on a situation where the
defendant was brought before the Court by way of forcible abduction
rather than through the use of an extradition treaty." Because the defendant's presence was not secured by virtue of the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru, he had no rights or defenses under the
treaty." The Court announced a general rule soon to be known as the Ker
doctrine: The power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired
by the manner in which he has been brought within the court's jurisdic16. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
17. For the full text of this treaty, see Treaty with Great Britain, Aug. 22, 1842, United
States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572.

18. 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
19. Id. at 2197.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2191 (quoting United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886)).

22. Id. at 2191-92.
23.

119 U.S. 436 (1886).

24. 112 S. Ct. at 2192. Defendant Ker was tried and convicted in an Illinois court for
larceny. His presence there was "procured by means of forcible abduction from Peru." Id.
Apparently, a messenger was sent to Lima to bring back Ker using a proper warrant under
the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru. For unknown reasons, the messenger instead ignored the formal extradition process and forcibly kidnapped Ker and

brought him to the United States. Id.
25. Id.
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tion, whether by forcible abduction, violation of international treaty, or
illegal arrest2 6
In Frisbie v. Collins, 7 the Supreme Court upheld the Ker doctrine.
The Court stated that no persuasive reasons existed to overrule that line
of cases (i.e. Ker), and that a guilty defendant should not be ''able
to "es2
cape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.
Respondent Alvarez-Machain argued that the differences between Ker
and the present case were dispositive. There, the United States government was not involved in the abduction, and the nation from which the
defendant was abducted did not object to his prosecution. Relying on
these differences and the rule espoused in Rauscher,2 respondent argued
that his prosecution, like that of defendant Rauscher, violated the implied terms of the Treaty.30
The government argued that Rauscher is an exception to the Ker doctrine "only" when an extradition treaty is invoked. 1 Because respondent
was not brought to the United States through the use of a treaty, Rau2
scher did not apply
At this point, the Court announced its first inquiry in its attempt to
resolve the issue: Whether the abduction violated the Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Mexico. The Court reasoned that if the
Treaty language did not prohibit forcible abductions, then the Ker doctrine would apply and respondent could be tried in a United States
3
court. 3

B.

The Treaty Does Not Prohibit Abductions

The first step in construing any treaty or statute is to look at the terms
of the document in order to determine its meaning.3 ' As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted, "The Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the
United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people
from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the
Treaty if such an abduction occurs."
26.

Id. (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)).

27.

342 U.S. 519 (1952).

28.

112 S. Ct. at 2192 (quoting Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)).

29. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
30. 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
31. Id.
32.

Id.

33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985); Valentine v. United States ex.
rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936).
35. 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
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In the absence of any express language directly on point, respondent
argued that Article 9 of the Treaty incorporated the terms of the bargain
on which the United States settled.,' The Court described respondent's
view of the bargain as follows:
If the United States wishes to prosecute a Mexican national, it may request that individual's extradition. Upon a request from the United
States, Mexico may either extradite the individual, or submit the case to
the proper authorities for prosecution in Mexico. In this way, respondent
reasons, each nation preserved its right to choose whether its nationals
would be tried in its own courts or by the courts of the other nation."
Respondent submitted that if either country were free to abduct nationals at will, the preservation of rights would be frustrated, and restrictions
on the obligation to extradite contained in the Treaty would "make no
sense."38
Chief Justice Rehnquist then promulgated the Court's view that Article
9 was not intended to be the only method of gaining custody of a foreign
national. Because countries are under no duty to surrender their citizens
to a foreign nation in the absence of a valid extradition treaty, it followed
that extradition treaties exist in order "to impose mutual obligations to
surrender individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following
established procedures."' The Court concluded that the Treaty merely
served as a mechanism, which would not otherwise exist, requiring the
countries to extradite individuals only under certain circumstances. 0 The
Treaty served to set forth the procedure to be used only when the Treaty
41
was invoked.
The Court next looked to the history of negotiation and practice under
the Treaty.' It noted that the Mexican government was aware of the Ker
doctrine and the United States' position on forcible abductions made
36. Id. Article 9 provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but
the executive authority of the Requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws
of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed
proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
31 U.S.T. at 506&
37. 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94.
38. Id. at 2194.
39. Id. (citing 1 J. MooRs, A TRATISE ON ExTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 72
(1891)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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outside the terms of the Treaty, yet failed to include any language in the
Treaty addressing this topic. In sum, the language of the instrument, in
the context of this history, failed to persuade the Court that the Treaty
prohibited abductions outside of its terms.-8
C. The Treaty Shall Not Contain An Implied Term Prohibiting
Abductions
Once the Court established that the Treaty contained no express
prohibitions to forcible abductions, it turned to the question of an implied prohibition." Respondent contended that in order to avoid upsetting international law principles,' 5 which clearly prohibit forcible abductions in the territory of another state without its consent, the Rauscher
line of reasoning should be used to imply a term prohibiting forcible abductions.' Chief Justice Rehnquist found this reference to international
law difficult to accept and justified the implied term in Rauscher as being
based on the practice of nations with respect to extradition treaties in
particular, but not with international law more generally.' 7 According to
the Court, respondent's argument would mean "that the Treaty acts as a
prohibition against a violation of the general principle of international
law that one government may not exercise its police power in the territory
of another state.' 4 The Court found this to be false reasoning because it
would lead to the improper and unintended conclusion that many actions
taken by a nation, including waging war, would violate the terms of the
Extradition Treaty between the two nations." While Rauscher was only a
small step to take, implying a term in this Treaty that prohibited securing the presence of individuals by means not specifically mentioned in the
instrument would.require "a much larger inferential leap, with only the
most general of international law principles to support it."bo
In conclusion, the Court conceded that the abduction may be shocking
and in violation of general international law principles, but noted that
Mexico's protest and the possibility of respondent's return to Mexico
43. Id. at 2194-95.
44., Id. at 2195.
45. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter states, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations." Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 2,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993.
46. 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
47. Id. at 2195-96.
48. Id. at 2196.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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were issues better left to the Executive Branch and its diplomatic approach, rather than to the unilateral actions of a court in one nation.51
However, the Supreme Court found respondent's abduction not in violation of the Extradition Treaty; therefore, the Ker doctrine applied, allowing respondent to be tried in a United States court for violations of
this country's laws.2
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

The outcome of United States v. Alvarez-Machain turned on both a
statutory interpretation issue and an international law issue. A valid argument can be made in favor of either respondent or the government
with regard to each of these issues; nevertheless, in the end the Court
found the government's position the most persuasive. In light of the applicable canons of statutory construction, placed in context with the relevent principles concerning international policy, the Court reached the
wrong conclusion.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The Court clearly applied a strict textualist approach in resolving the
issue of whether the Treaty prohibited forcible abductions. With Justice
Scalia joining in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed
the Treaty completely within the parameters of the instrument itself. The
Court refused to go beyond the text of the document and found the language to be plain and unambiguous. 3 The Treaty contained no language
tailored to the issue of forcible abductions and, as mentioned, the Court
declined to imply any. Therefore, according to the Court, forcible abductions do not violate the Treaty."
The Court failed to give any attention to the well-established doctrine
that the letter is only the surface-whatever is within the reason of the
law is within the law itself and it is necessary to go beyond the text to
effectuate the purpose of the document.5 5 Because it is presumed that
every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law serves some purpose or
objective, "ambiguities can be intelligently resolved, first, by identifying
that purpose and the policy or principle it embodies and, then, by deducing the result most consonant with that principle or policy."5 Thus, the
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 2197.
See supra text accompanying note 35.
See supra text accompanying note 52.

55. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv.691, 694-700 (1987).
56. Id. at 695-96.
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purpose of the Treaty must be determined and the Court's interpretation
should serve that purpose.
The Treaty appears to be drafted to cover the entire subject of extradition between the countries."7 Although a preamble will not expand the
scope of its document, preambles may be consulted to determine the true
construction of terms and therefore the purpose to be achieved."' This
particular preamble informs the parties that the Treaty is designed to
help the nations "cooperate more closely in the fight against crime" and
to "mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition." 5' 9 Basically, the spirit, or intent, of the Treaty is to promote peaceful relations
between the countries and a judicial construction leading to this result is
desirable. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, "It is difficult to
see how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action [forcible abductions] could foster cooperation and mutual assistance-the stated
goals of the Treaty."'
In contrast to the strict textual approach employed by the Court,61 a
more persuasive theory would hold that when the literal interpretation
leads to a result that thwarts the manifest purpose of the instrument, the
instrument (Treaty) may be implemented beyond its text.' 2 Because the
purpose of the Treaty, in addition to the various provisions governing the
aspects and procedures of extradition, would be "utterly frustrated"" and
useless under the Court's ruling (which allowed forcible abductions as
permissible governmental conduct), a prohibition on international abductions should have been implied. Respondent Alvarez-Machain had the
more convincing argument.
57. 112 S. Ct. at 2198.
58. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 395, 401-06 (1950).
59.

Extradition Treaty, supra note 3 at 5061.

60.

112 S. Ct. at 2198 n.4.

61. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982). The Supreme Court will sometimes
find the bare language of a statute determinative and will apply it stringently, even if it
yields unreasonable results. See, e.g.; Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300
(1983).
62. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); Helvering v. Hammel,
311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941). When a literal interpretation will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, those intentions must control. Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
63. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1991).
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B. InternationalLaw Principles
The legal context (international law) in which the countries drafted the
Treaty also militates toward a decision in favor of respondent in this case.
It seems logical to assume that the parties would not ratify a treaty that
violates international law. To construe the Treaty as permitting forcible
abductions without the consent of the offended nation would be to give
the Treaty a construction that uproots the territorial integrity of another
state. As one author notes:
The universally accepted principle that . . .a state has the exclusive

right to exercise governmental authority within its territory and that
consequently the officials of one state may not exercise such authority
within the territory of another state without the consent of the latter
thus serves to6 facilitate private activities as well as friendly relations between states. '
The Treaty could not have been signed with the expectation that the
United States has the right to decide unilaterally to enter Mexican territory and abduct one of their nationals.
The Court dismissed the fact that the Mexican government formally
protested the abduction by reasoning that the views of a foreign government cannot change the impact of the express Treaty language. This severe adherence to a textual construction completely ignores any principles of foreign relations, which many agree strictly prohibit international
abductions.s5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a defendant has standing to challenge his abduction under international law
principles after his country has lodged an official objection or protest to
the conduct." This implies that as a matter of international law, when
one nation objects to the abduction, the offending nation has a duty to
divest itself of jurisdiction over the defendant.67 As the chief reporter for
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations stated,
"When done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and a
gross disrepect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind."" Therefore,
64.

OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND ToMoRRow

13 (1965).

65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. b (1987). "Itis universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exer-

cise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent." Id.
66. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. c (1987). In the absence of
such a protest by the offended nation, the abducting nation may proceed to prosecute the

defendant under its own laws. Id.
68. Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L.J. 215,
231 (1992).
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the Court should have construed the Treaty to effectuate the purpose of
fostering international relations so as not to violate accepted principles.
The Court, in its reliance on Ker, also dismissed completely the fact
that the United States government, and not a private party, sanctioned
this abduction. The dissent argued that the majority actually analyzed
the issue as it was presented in Ker,so where a private citizen's actions
were found not to violate the treaty in question.70 Because that kidnapping took place "without any pretense of authority under the treaty or
from the government of the United States," the Court found no invasion
of the sovereignty of the other nation (Peru).7 1 The Supreme Court had
never before considered the particular issue presented in this case.72 The
all-important and distinguishing fact in Alvarez-Machain is that it was
the conduct of the United States that is called into question. When the
government of the United States is the offending party, principles of international law (i.e., the preservation of another's sovereign territory)
mandate that the Court find a violation and dismiss its jurisdiction to
hear the case.73
The Court submitted that the issue was a matter for the Executive
Branch, rather than the courts, to settle through diplomatic methods.7 '
This may be a valid argument when the government was not involved in
the kidnapping; however, when the United States authorizes the abduction, the Court has a duty to divest itself of jurisdiction. The Court's
opinion has been critized as "ignor[ing] the fundamental principle of international law, namely, respect for the territorial sovereignty of states.' 75
Furthermore, it has been suggested that if'the principles announced by
the Court were applied, "the International Juridical Order would be irreversibly shattered."' 6 Therefore, the United States is obligated to return
7
Alvarez-Machain to Mexico.
The case law in the area of international abductions illustrates a trend
among the circuit courts holding that in extreme circumstances involving
outrageous and reprehensible governmental conduct, a court is required
69.
70.
71.

112 S. Ct. at 2203.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.

72.

112 S. Ct. at 2191.

73.

See supra text accompanying note 45. This contention is further supported by a

recent decision from the Court-of Appeals of the Republic of South Africa. That court held
that.the prosecution of a defendant kidnapped by agents of South Africa in another country
must be dismissed because the abduction "represents a violation of the applicable rules of
international law." S v. Ebrahim, S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991).
74. 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
75. David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 50.

76. Id.
77.

Id.
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to divest itself of jurisdiction." The majority of the Court in AlvarezMachain agreed with the district court that the conduct did not qualify
as outrageous. However, DEA agents reportedly punched AlvarezMachain, injected him with a drug that made him lightheaded, and
shocked him many times during the seizure. These actions, carried out
under the authority of the United States government, certainly may be
considered outrageous by some. At least one court has held that principles of international law, as well as the Charter of the United Nations,"s
require forcible abduction cases like this to yield to a new expanded interpretation of due process."'
In sum, the Court's decision ignores both fundamental canons of construction and underlying principles of international law. The purpose of
the Treaty, in light of current international relations, must be given effect
by the Court. Bruce Zagaris, a Washington, D.C. lawyer who specializes in
international criminal cases, described the result of this decision most appropriately when he stated that Alvarez-Machain may disrupt orderly
foreign relations."1 Zagaris concludes that the "'United States is finding
it very difficult to negotiate extradition and international .

.

. treaties'

because foreign governments 'are understandably concerned that they
have to cover every possible issue in any signed treaty ...

and this has

sent a lot of confusion into our relations with other countries.' "" As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the Court may have had a strong desire
to punish Alvarez-Machain, s but it should not have abandoned standard
principles of interpretation and international law in order to justify an
action that is simply not allowable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the narrow and strict textualist approach employed, the
Court determined that the Treaty did not expressly prohibit forcible abductions between the United States and Mexico. The Court also refused
to imply this prohibition on abductions in light of the general principles
78. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
79. See Charter of the United Nations, supra note 45.
80. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). For a further discussion of
international abductions, United States authority, and constitutional issues, see Theodore
C. Jonas, Note, International"FugitiveSnatching" in U.S. Law: Two Views from Opposite
Ends of the Eighties, 24 COaRNELL INT'L L.J. 521 (1991).
81. Stewart, supra note 75, at 52.
82. Stewart, supra note 75, at 52.
83. 112 S. Ct. at 2205.
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of international law argued by respondent. This would have required too
large an inferential leap, and the Court declined to take it.
The better approach would have been to construe the Treaty with regard to its stated goal of mutually assisting the parties in their efforts to
cooperate in the field of extradition. In order to serve this purpose and
avoid a violation of the accepted principle of territorial sovereignty, the
Court should have divested itself of jurisdiction and returned respondent
to Mexico." Whether the Court reached the proper decision or not, one
thing is for certain: Alvarez-Machain has attracted international attention and has "triggered a firestorm of diplomatic criticism. '' ss
STEPHEN M. WELSH

84. On December 14, 1992, U.S. District Judge Edward Rafeedie acquitted AlvarezMachain on his kidnapping and murder charges, citing lack of evidence. Haya El Nasser,
Mexican Doctor is Acquitted, USA TODAY, December 15, 1992, at 3A. The ACLU responded
that the acquittal "underscores how terrible the Supreme Court's decision was to allow this
kind of behavior [international abductions]." Id.
85. Stewart, supra note 75, at 50.

